Cognitive psychology and problem solving in the physical sciences by Sands, David & Overton, Tina
Issue 6  21
Review 
David Sands* and            
Tina Overton  
Department of Physical 
Sciences 
University of Hull 
Hull 
HU6 7RX 
*d.sands@hull.ac.uk 
Cognitive psychology and problem  
solving in the physical sciences 
Abstract 
This paper provides and introduction to the literature on cognitive psychology and 
problem solving in physical sciences.  We consider the working memory and its three 
different components, two of which hold and record information and are controlled by an 
executive that controls attention. Working memory alone cannot explain problem solving 
ability and we review the influence of schemata, the construction of mental models, 
visual reasoning and the cognitive style of field dependence.  
 
Introduction 
The ability to solve problems is widely recognised as an important outcome of 
undergraduate programmes. For example, in 2008 alone there were over 160 papers 
published in over 100 different journals which covered topics as diverse as child 
development, psychology, cognition, computers, neurosciences, mathematics and 
education1. The breadth is quite staggering, but we are interested mainly in problems in 
chemistry and physics. Intuitively we feel that problem solving in these areas is likely to 
be different from problem solving in, say, mathematics or medicine. Is it, though? Or is it 
just that the content is different but the techniques are similar? Specifying exactly what it 
is we do when solving problems is difficult enough, but defining exactly what we should 
be teaching and how seems nigh on impossible.  
 
The first question that inevitably arises is, what do we mean by problem solving? Hayes 
wrote in 19802: „Whenever there is a gap between where you are now and where you 
want to be, and you don‟t know how to find a way to cross that gap, you have a problem.‟ 
A similar view was expressed by Wheatley3: „Problem solving is what you do when you 
don‟t know what to do.‟ Pithy, but seemingly not too helpful. However, they express the 
essential difficulty: if you‟re at a loss, how do you get started? Perhaps specific help can 
be offered in specific circumstances, but it would be better if we could identify the 
essential elements of a problem solving strategy. As we will show, knowledge is 
important, but knowledge alone is not enough. Can we identify what else is needed and 
change the way we teach to cultivate problem solving abilities? This paper will attempt to 
answer these questions by drawing on the literature from cognitive psychology and both 
physics and chemistry education research to lay down some general principles of 
problem solving. 
 
Expert-Novice studies 
Much of the early literature on problem solving were concerned with general processes 
and rules for reasoning and problem solving „... that might be acquired as transferable 
habits of thinking‟4. The content of such studies were abstract problems, or perhaps 
puzzles, that had little direct connection with the domains of knowledge with which      
real-life problem solvers were familiar and in which they operated. It was not until the late 
1970s that the artificial intelligence (AI) community began to construct computer 
programmes of problem solving and the importance of domain-specific knowledge, and 
in particular the organising principles behind the knowledge structures of experts, was 
recognised. Physics was identified as an established problem-solving discipline and 
provided the context in which many of the early expert-novice studies were undertaken.  
 
Two papers stand out from that time by Larkin et al5 and by Chi et al6. Larkin et al were 
concerned to produce computer programmes that replicated human thinking and 
described a few examples, at the heart of which are production rules. These are specific 
algorithms that generate actions from given conditions: „if x then y‟. This paper is 
remarkable for its early recognition of all the important features of problem solving that 
have dominated the literature since, including in particular working memory capacity and 
the use of representations, both internal and external. Working memory capacity is 
essentially how much information can be held in the head at any one time. Larkin et al 
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described expert chess players who can memorise with 
remarkable accuracy the positions of some 25 or so chess 
pieces on a board after looking at them for only a few 
seconds. Novices, on the other hand, can remember only a 
few pieces, but experts perform in much the same way as 
novices if the pieces are placed randomly. Experts are familiar 
with many different patterns of play and clearly recognise and 
recall those patterns, thereby reducing the load on working 
memory. Experts in physics employ similar strategies, working 
forward from the givens to the solutions on simple kinematics 
problems. Novices, or students, tend to work backwards and 
according to Larkin et al this is a more efficient search 
strategy. Clearly experts are not searching; they are 
recognising patterns and working with them. 
 
Chi et al discuss many of the same things, but they were 
concerned to look also at how knowledge is structured. Rather 
than solving problems, they asked experts and novices to 
characterise a set of end-of-chapter problems according to 
common features. Experts characterised the problems 
according to principles or laws 
involved in their solution, whereas 
students characterised them 
according to common surface 
features. In Glaser‟s words4; “…
[the] knowledge of novices is 
organised around  the literal 
objects explicitly given in a 
problem statement. Experts‟ 
knowledge, on the other hand, is 
organized around principles and 
abstractions that subsume these 
objects.” Access and use of 
knowledge is “a major component 
of thinking” according to Glaser4, 
but there is one aspect of thinking 
that is not really addressed in any 
of these papers: that is the use of 
qualitative reasoning. Much is 
made of content knowledge: 
concepts, laws, facts, etc. and the 
procedural and strategic 
knowledge of how, where and when to use it. But the 
problems in these studies are quantitative, so the methods 
used to solve the problem are also quantitative. However, 
according to di Sessa7, “qualitative controls quantitative”. In 
other words, it is much easier to arrive at a quantitative 
solution if first there is a qualitative understanding. Equations 
might symbolise concepts or laws but those symbols must be 
connected to “richly elaborated mental constructs” which are 
qualitative in nature. It is these qualitative relationships that 
allow us to plan and execute a problem-solving strategy. 
 
Representations 
A representation of a problem is an essential component of 
the mental constructs to which di Sessa refers. Experts spend 
a great deal more time than do novices on understanding the 
problem, and an essential part of that understanding is 
drawing a diagram. Glaser4 calls a representation constructed 
in order to understand a problem a „cognitive structure‟. That 
is to say, the construction of a representation is part of our 
thinking about a problem, from understanding through to the 
formulation of a solution. There are two kinds of    
representation of particular interest: diagrams and mental 
images. In Nersessian‟s view8, these two constitute a coupled 
system. That is to say, we use diagrams and mental images 
as the basis of a form of qualitative reasoning whish 
Nersessian calls „model-based reasoning‟. 
 
It comes as something of a surprise to many science 
educators to find that diagrammatic representation and 
reasoning has been a topic of study for many years within the 
AI community. There is too much work to quote here, so we 
will restrict ourselves to a few illustrative examples. Of 
particular relevance is the work of Suwa and Tversky9, who, 
studying the way that designers use diagrams, concluded that 
diagrams contribute to the dynamic construction of ideas. In 
particular, diagrams free working memory by putting down on 
paper ideas and concepts that might otherwise have to be 
held in the head. Diagrams also cue retrieval from long term 
memory through the recognition of particular structures or 
patterns, allow perceptual judgements about spatial relations, 
and, most perhaps most important of all, allow the generation 
of new ideas.  
 
Within the physical sciences 
education research literature there 
is also extensive evidence for the 
use of diagrams and mental 
representations both to 
understand a problem and to 
formulate a solution. One of the 
criticisms often levelled at early 
expert-novice studies is that the 
problems do not represent much 
of a challenge to experts who, by 
and large, are familiar with the 
material. Singh10 conducted a 
study in which he presented 
experts in physics with a problem 
to which they did not know the 
solution. He observed that 
diagrams were often constructed, 
but in addition experts use other 
techniques to develop an answer, 
including consideration of limiting 
cases. In order to do this it is 
necessary to create and run a mental model. This is 
Nersessian‟s model-based reasoning. Within Chemistry 
Bodner‟s work stands out11, as does the work of Stieff and 
Raje12. The latter presented experts with problems in organic 
chemistry from finals papers from a range of universities. The 
aim of their paper was ostensibly to show that experts use 
techniques other than visualisation. The technique used most 
was recall of either the problem or the solution, which of 
course obviates the need to visualise or draw a diagram. The 
next most common techniques were either visualisation or the 
use of a diagram. 
 
Spatial ability: the role of working memory 
The ability to manipulate mental images in the manner just 
described varies from person to person and is closely related 
to working memory13. Working memory capacity has already 
been mentioned, and the concept is fairly well known within 
science education, but capacity is only one aspect. According 
to Baddely14, the originator of the concept, the term is taken 
„to apply to a limited capacity system that is capable of storing 
and manipulating information and that is assumed to be an 
integral part of the human memory system‟. The concept of 
working memory is an extension of the earlier psychological 
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concept of short term memory which was seen essentially as 
a temporary repository of information before it entered long 
term memory. Working memory, on the other hand, is not a 
unitary system and also has a „functional role in other 
cognitive tasks such as learning reasoning and     
comprehension‟14. 
 
Understanding exactly what the different components of 
working memory do and how they relate to each other is still 
an ongoing question for psychologists. It is even more difficult 
for non-psychologists interested in how it affects performance 
in science learning to understand the concept. Essentially 
working memory is seen as a tripartite system: two slave 
functions which hold and record information controlled by an 
executive that controls attention, how it may be switched from 
one focus to another, the activation of long term memory, and 
possibly also the processing of information. The slave 
functions are quite distinct, with one, the phonological loop, 
holding acoustic or speech-based information and the other, 
the visuo-spatial sketch pad, holding spatial and visual 
information. Despite being perceived visually, written words 
are still controlled by the phonological loop. 
 
The phonological loop is the best understood component of 
working memory, but for our purposes it is the least 
interesting. In Baddeley‟s view14, this system probably evolved 
as a crucial component of language acquisition, so, beyond 
determining memory capacity, it is not directly involved in 
problem solving. Memory capacity, important as it is, is only 
one aspect of working memory. It is measured by          
speech-based information so it is connected to the 
phonological loop, but it is commonly supposed that there is a 
similar capacity for spatial or visual information. However, the 
visuo-spatial sketch pad is not nearly as well understood. For 
example, the capacity for speech-based information arises 
because the memory refreshes itself automatically. If 
refreshing is prevented, say by a distraction, the information is 
lost after even just a couple of seconds. In a long sequence of 
data, therefore, the last information is processed after the first 
information has disappeared from memory. All this is well 
known and well understood within psychology, but the      
visuo-spatial sketch pad is much more complex and its 
characteristics correspondingly harder to measure. In addition, 
some of its functions, especially those related to imagery, rely 
heavily on the central executive, which is understood even 
less. 
 
Psychologists investigate the relationship between these 
different components through interference tests. That is, 
propositional reasoning is assumed to occur through the 
phonological loop, so if a subject is made to undertake a 
simple spatial secondary task it is possible to see to what 
extent the spatial task interferes with the primary15. If there is 
no interference the systems are assumed to be separate. The 
picture that emerges from the literature is that propositional 
reasoning often involves a spatial component. Complex 
propositions might, for example, invoke imagistic strategies 
such as the mental construction of Venn diagrams.  It is also 
clear that spatial reasoning relies heavily on the central 
executive and that a limited capacity in the central executive 
can affect the ability to reason spatially and           
propositionally16,17. This is the basis for individual differences 
in spatial ability, but the implications for problem solving in the 
physical sciences will not be clear until the concept of field 
dependence-independence (FDI) has been described. 
 
Field dependence-independence 
FDI was initially used to describe the ability to perceive upright 
in a darkened room where the only visible objects, an 
illuminated square frame and a rod, may be oriented 
independently at an arbitrary angle18. Some subjects perceive 
upright to correspond to the orientation of the frame while 
others are able to define upright correctly regardless of what 
they see. People who take their cue from the visual field are 
said to be field dependent. It quickly emerged that field 
dependence defined in this way correlated with a range of 
other characteristics, most notably the inability to disembed 
important information from a perceptual field and the inability 
to order information. The consequences can be quite 
profound. First, in relation to disembedding, FD subjects often 
struggle to decide what is important or not in a problem 
statement. Second, as described by Witkin, learned material 
often lacks an inherent structure and, whereas field 
independent students are able to re-order material to aid their 
own learning, field dependent students struggle. Not 
surprisingly, a study of Spanish school children revealed a 
significant achievement gap across all subjects which is not 
accounted for by differences in general intelligence19. There 
are other studies that show directly, and quite emphatically, 
how, for field dependent students, learning in science can 
depend on the way material is presented and structured20-22.  
 
These two effects are related to the central executive. 
Describing the role of working memory in the construction of 
mental models, García-Madruga states that one of the 
functions of the central executive is to discard irrelevant 
information16. Ordering information clearly places a high load 
on the working memory. First, several concepts have to be 
held in the mind at once, but in addition there has to be a fair 
amount of reasoning about the concepts which is likely to be 
more demanding than simple propositional reasoning. 
Concepts have be understood not only in themselves, but also 
in their relationship to each other. There might even be a 
spatial element in as much as the concepts of before or after, 
first or last, following, etc. might well imply spatial relations 
and invoke spatial imagery. The central executive is likely to 
be heavily loaded during such a task and individuals with a 
low capacity will struggle. Rittschof23 summarises much of the 
psychological research which links field dependence to the 
central executive. 
 
Problem solving: how can it be taught? 
The preceding has laid down some of the essential ideas in 
cognitive psychology that relate to problem solving in the 
sciences. Necessarily the ideas are brief and the reader is 
referred to the literature for a deeper understanding. What is 
clear, though, is that problem solving is a complex activity and 
the idea that we might teach problem solving as a technique in 
the same way that we might teach other skills like computing 
does not stand up. Rather, it appears to be something that 
ought to be cultivated over a long time. The first requirement 
is for students to build up a body of knowledge, but often we 
want to set problems as a way of developing knowledge. This 
is a contradiction and probably explains why many problems 
are algorithmic in nature. Students simply do not have the 
knowledge, not to mention other skills, to cope with more 
complex, open-ended problems.  Moreover, in trying to build 
up this knowledge, we run into the problem of field 
dependence. 
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The construct originally described by Witkin is likely to be 
binary; either one can perceive upright independently of the 
visual field or one can not. However, field dependence today 
is often measured using a spatial reasoning test involving 
hidden figures and a broad spectrum of abilities is often 
measured, including field neutrality. The terms field 
dependence and independence should therefore be 
interpreted as tendencies rather than absolutes. That said, we 
have no real idea of the distribution of these tendencies 
among physical science students in UK universities. It is a 
common experience, however, that abilities vary greatly and 
perhaps more so now that higher education is more inclusive. 
If we accept that some of these students tend to field 
dependence we must recognise the possibility that 
conventional lectures will leave many of them floundering. 
Field dependent students appear to be very inefficient at 
making their own notes24. As they can neither discard 
irrelevant information nor impose order on perceived material 
they produce notes that are wordy, lack coherence, and 
appear to be hard to learn from. However, if they are given an 
outline which provides an external structure they can learn just 
as well as field independent 
students whose notes, by 
contrast, tend to be in outline 
form, with headings, 
subheadings and a great 
deal of order to the 
information.  
 
The body of knowledge 
should, if possible, include 
schemata. A schema may be 
considered to be a mental 
model around which 
information is organised. For 
example, the concept of an 
elastic collision implies hard 
spheres as well as the 
conservation of both 
momentum and energy. 
Thus, a schema helps to 
reduce the load on the 
working memory by allowing access to a series of 
associations held in long term memory. Schema are best 
developed by students themselves working cooperatively in a 
constructivist environment such as the modelling approach 
advocated by Hestenes25. Modelling is one form of problem 
solving. It often employs the sort of qualitative reasoning that 
we have argued is an essential component of scientific 
thought. As we have argued, such reasoning is not just 
propositional but may be spatial or diagrammatic, which brings 
us nicely to the subject of spatial abilities and whether they 
can be improved. 
 
Spatial ability is very closely linked to field dependence and to 
the central executive in working memory. Spatial abilities 
therefore vary among individuals and ultimately might be 
limited by biology, but even if the capacity in the central 
executive or the visuo-spatial sketch pad is fixed there might 
be reason to suppose that strategies can be developed to 
compensate. Baddeley14, for example, describes patients with 
severe impairments to some of the functions of working 
memory who nonetheless cope well. The use of diagrams is 
likely to form part of that strategy. We have described how 
diagrams are used to understand problems and also to 
develop solutions, but crucially they reduce the load on 
working memory. Depending on the nature of the problem and 
on the individual, iconic mental models might be developed 
and manipulated, but if the mental models become too 
complicated it is necessary to free up working memory by 
setting some of the information down on paper. Once on 
paper spatial relations might be more easily perceived and 
investigated through the medium of the diagram.  
 
Diagrams are important for another, perhaps unexpected, 
reason. Sorby26 reports that one of the best ways of 
developing spatial abilities is old-fashioned sketching. 
Perception appears to be very important for developing spatial 
skills. Holding and manipulating physical models, for example 
rotating them, also appears to work. Although these methods 
have been investigated in the context of engineering 
education, and in fact there is interest around the world27,28 in 
improving spatial abilities in engineering students, this is a 
technique that is immediately applicable to organic and 
molecular chemistry. It might be thought that working with 3-D 
computer graphics will help, but in fact it does not. It seems 
that there has to be some 
spatial reasoning associated 
with the task: imagery, 
mental rotation, mental 
extrapolation, etc. This is 
why sketching is so useful: it 
requires spatial reasoning to 
identify relationship as well 
as important components, 
which is especially 
interesting in light of the 
work by Mohler29. Mohler 
investigated practical 
differences between high 
and low spatial ability 
students by analysing their 
performance in a spatial task 
involving complicated 
diagrams. Even high spatial 
ability students can 
experience cognitive 
overload; „…I screw stuff up because when you‟re looking at 
everything, … it‟s easy to get real messed up‟. The difference 
is that students with high spatial ability recognise it and work 
on smaller portions of the diagram whereas those with low 
spatial ability do not. Mohler asks whether this skill can be 
taught, and as yet there is no answer. Perhaps it is a 
manifestation of the central executive‟s inability to discriminate 
and discard irrelevant information, but if it can be taught, 
perhaps sketching might be one way. In constructing a sketch 
it is necessary to make a choice about what is important and 
what is not in order to put something down on paper. Activities 
that encourage the construction of diagrams in problem 
solving do more than simply provide a mechanism for 
reasoning about the problem. 
 
Conclusion 
The present work has considered the cognitive psychology of 
problem solving from early expert-novice studies through to 
later studies on spatial reasoning and the cognitive style of 
field dependence. We have shown that qualitative reasoning 
about problems precedes quantitative reasoning and is an 
essential aspect of scientific inquiry. We have also discussed 
at length spatial abilities and their role in problem solving, 
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particularly in constructing mental models and diagrams. It is 
clear that students of low spatial ability are to some extent 
disadvantaged in a conventional academic environment, but 
designing activities that will allow field independent students to 
flourish while at the same time providing the kind of support 
that will benefit field dependent students is by no means easy. 
According to Rittshof, “studies from several decades past 
emphasise the ways that field dependent learners benefit from 
external types of information structuring and motivation, while 
field independent learners benefit from the opportunity to use 
their own structuring of information and motivation as they 
construct knowledge”. Serving both sets of students at the 
same time poses a tremendous challenge, one that perhaps 
has only been appreciated within the field of cognitive 
psychology. However, by looking at that literature as well as 
that from education research we can at last begin to 
appreciate what we should be aiming for. We have suggested 
how spatial skills might be cultivated, but there is a lack of 
practical knowledge about the best way forward. 
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